Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Shirley Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn C. Harris; Spence, Moriarity & Schuster; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant .
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs; Robert L. Moody; Taylor, Moody & Thorne; John M Chipman; Clifford
J. Payne; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman, & Quigley; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, No. 940550 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6183

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAf"
DCC
en

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAR

h.->r.«PT Mn ^f06^CN - ^ A
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 940550-CA
Priority No. 15

vs.
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT
GROVE CITY,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382)
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628)
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655)
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration
ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 N. Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith

FILED
JMU9«*
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 940550-CA

vs.

Priority No. 15

PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT
GROVE CITY,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382)
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628)
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655)
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration
ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 N. Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE

3

STATUTES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

A. Nature of the Case

5

B. Course of Proceedings

6

C. Disposition of the Case

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

13
Point 1: The Trial Court Committed Reversible
Error When It Granted Defendants Twelve
Peremptory Challenges.

13

A. The trial court erred in failing to comply with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47.

13

B. The trial court erred in granting each Defendant
four peremptory challenges when no cross claims
had been filed.

15

C.

Defendants lack substantial controversy

15

D. The trial court committed reversible error
in awarding Defendants twelve peremptory
challenges.

18

i

Point 2: The Jury Erred in Finding Defendant Pleasant
Grove City 0% Negligent.

20

A. Marshaling the evidence

20

B. The jury lacked sufficent evidence in deciding
that Pleasant Grove City was 0% negligent.

21

Point 3: The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give the
Right-Of-Way Jury Instruction Offered by Ms. Carrier. . .

24

Point 4: The Trial Court Erred by Allowing Newell
Knight to Improperly Testify.

27

CONCLUSION

30

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, (Utah App. 1987)

27

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

1

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

21

Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)
13, 30
First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990)

20

Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 141, 140 P.2d 772 (1943)

24

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Utah,
861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993)
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447

20

(Utah 1993)

2

Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). . .
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991)
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993)

1,2
24

11, 12, 14-19, 30

Reeves v. Gentile 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991)

24

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989)

21

Seybold v. Union Pacific R.R., 121 Utah 61, 239 P.2d 174 (1951)

24

State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983)

29

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1991)

12, 24, 25, 27

State v. Jerrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)

29

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)

1

iii

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

1,2

Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (1926)

14, 15

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985)

1

Ward v. Richfield City, 793 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990)

1

Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981)

24, 25

Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990)

2, 29

RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 32(1) (1992)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (1992)

29
1, 3, 11, 13, 14

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 607 (1992)

4

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 611 (1994)

4, 5, 29

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 (1994)

5, 13, 30

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1994)
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72 (1992)

1
3, 4, 25

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Annot. 32 A.LR.3d 747 (1970)

14

IV

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over this appeal arises under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This appeal presents the following issues for review:
1.

Did the trial court err in granting Defendants three times as many

peremptory challenges as those given to the Plaintiff?
Standard of Review:

In deciding to give Defendants twelve

peremptory challenges, the trial court interpreted Rule 47 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Utah law, an interpretation of a statute is a

question of law to which the appellate court gives no deference, rather it
reviews the interpretation for correctness.

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,

1357 (Utah 1993); Ward v. Richfield City, 793 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
The correctness standard means "the appellate court decides the matter for
itself. . . ." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiff/Appellant preserved this issue in the trial court with a
Motion to Limit the Defendants' Number of Peremptory Challenges.
(Exhibit 1, Motion, R 381).

The trial court denied the Motion. (Exhibit 2,

Transcript July 15, 1993).
2.

Did the trial court err in finding Defendant Pleasant Grove City 0%

negligent?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing a jury's verdict, the appellate

court will reverse the judgment if it lacks substantial evidence to support
it. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,

817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). See also,

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (evidence did not
support jury's finding of constructive fraud); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing,

1

Inc.,

787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990) (no substantial evidence existed to
show plaintiff was negligent).
Plaintiff/Appellant's

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial, preserves this issue.
R. 832).

The court denied Ms. Carrier's Motion.

(Motion,

(Order, October 29, 1993,

R.1003.
3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to give the right-of-way, jury

instruction offered by counsel for Ms. Carrier?
Standard of Review.

The appellate court reviews a trial court's

refusal to give a jury instruction for correctness.
11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,452 (Utah 1993).

Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., v.
The correctness standard

means that "the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law."

Pena,

869

P.2d at 936 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiff/Appellant preserved this issue by objecting to the Court's
refusal to give the requested instruction.
24 to 2533, line 17).

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2532, line

Plaintiff/Appellant also objected to the court's

decision to give a different right-of-way instruction.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R.

#2538, lines 2-10).
4.

Did the trial court err in allowing rebuttal witness Newell Knight

to improperly

testify?

Standard of Review:

The appellate court will reverse a ruling on

cross-examination when the trial court abused its discretion.
American

Whitehead

Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Utah 1990).

Plaintiff/Appellant

preserved this issue by objecting.

Vol. X-R. #2439, lines 5-14;

(Transcript

#2478 lines 8-12; # 2524, line 18 to #2525

line 8).
2

v.

Jurors.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47

(1992).

(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or
two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and
impaneled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the
order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict become unable
or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall
be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and
challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal
jurors.
An alternate juror shall be discharged after the jury
retires to consider its verdict.
If one or two alternate jurors
are called each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in
addition to those otherwise allowed.
The additional
peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate
juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law
shall not be used against the alternates.
(c)
Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge
is an objection made to the trial jurors and may be directed (1)
to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. Either party may
challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.

(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number
of
peremptory challenges.
The challenges to individual jurors
are either peremptory or for cause.
Each party shall be
entitled to three peremptory challenges except as provided
under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.

Right-of-way between vehicles -Code Annotated § 41-6-72 (1992).

unregulated

intersection.

(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection
not regulated by an official traffic control device shall yield the
3

Utah

right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the intersection
from a different highway.
(2) Except as specified in sub sections (3) and (4), when
more than one vehicle enters or approaches an intersection
from different highways at approximately the same time and
the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control
device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control is
inoperative;
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, the
operator of the vehicle on the left will yield the right-of- way
to the operator on the right unless otherwise directed by a
peace officer.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32 (1992).
in court proceedings.

Use of

deposition

(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part of all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence
applied as though the witness were present and testifying, may
be used against any party who was present or represented at
the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice
thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for any
other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Who may impeach.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 607

(1992).

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including
the party calling him.
Mode and order of
Evidence, Rule 611

interrogation
(1992).

4

and

presentation.

Utah

Rules

(b) Scope of cross-examination.
Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the
witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.

Opinion
(1994).

on

ultimate

issue.

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence,

Rule

704

(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.
(b)
No expert witness testifying with respect to the
mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Shirley Carrier filed suit on January 7, 1992 against Pleasant Grove
City, William Roger Smith, and Mr. Smith's employer Pro-Tech Restoration.
(Amended Complaint, R. 45).

She alleged that Defendant Pleasant Grove's

negligence in failing to report and replace a missing stop sign proximately
caused a collision involving her and Defendant Smith.
In addition,

Ms. Carrier claimed

that Defendant

(Id. at 4-7, R 42-39).
Smith drove his

car

negligently and proximately caused the collision. (Id. at 2-4, R. 44-42). As
a result of Defendants' negligence, Ms. Carrier was seriously injured and
sought to recover damages.

5

B. Course of Proceedings
Defendants each filed answers to Ms. Carrier's claims, arguing that
Ms.

Carrier's

negligence

caused

culpability. (R. 13, 15, 59).

her

injuries

and

denying

their

own

The Fourth Judicial District Court tried the case

before a jury beginning on July 15, 1993.

Testimony continued from July

15 through July 22, at which time the court recessed the case in order to
hear other matters previously scheduled. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. # 20852086).
Eleven days later the case resumed and the jury heard testimony on
August 2 and 3, 1993.

(Transcript, Vol. VII-VIII, R. 2101-2296).

Again

the court recessed the case and thirteen days later, on August 16 and 17,
the trial continued.
recess

occurred

(Transcript, Vol. IX-X, R. 2297-2407).

and on August

24,

1993 closing

Another week's

arguments

and jury

deliberations finally took place.
C. Disposition of the Case
On August 24, the jury returned a verdict finding Shirley Carrier 60%
negligent, William Roger Smith 40% liable, and Pleasant Grove City 0% at
fault.

(Judgment on Jury Verdict, R. 815).

Ms. Carrier filed a Motion for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New
Trial on September 1, 1993.

(Motion, R. 832).

motions on October 29, 1993.

(Order, R. 1003).

The court denied these

Subsequently, on November 12, 1993, Ms. Carrier filed a Motion for
Relief from Judgment.

(Motion, R. 1011).

1993, also denied this motion.

The court, on November 24,

(Order, R. 1048).

Ms. Carrier filed a notice of appeal on November 23, 1993.
Appeal, R. 1036.3).

(Notice of

On December 23, 1993, Ms. Carrier sought summary

disposition from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court
6

declined to summarily reverse the case on January 10, 1994.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Pleasant Grove City, on January

15, 1991, Defendant

William

Roger Smith drove his employer's vehicle into the path of Shirley Carrier's
oncoming automobile.

(Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2041, lines 23-25).

Carrier could neither stop nor avoid the resulting impact; she
serious injury.

Ms.

suffered

(Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2042, lines 4-6).

The collision occurred as Ms. Carrier was returning home, east on
1100 North, a route she had used for the past six years. (Transcript, Vol.
VI-R. #2040, lines 1-16).

Ms. Carrier used 1100 North because the City

had designed it as a "through" street or "collector" road with the right of
way.

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1837, line 17 to # 1838, line 11; Vol. V-R.

#1981, lines 6-16).
Defendant

Smith entered

1100 North from 500 East, going

(Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1477, lines 11-13).
that

intersection

had

been

controlled

For more than twenty years,

by

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1839, lines 5-14,).

stop

signs

Smith and all

traffic on 500 East was broken off and missing.
lines

14-16).

The

stop

sign

across

northbound traffic on 500 East, remained in place.
#1486, lines 7-15).

on

500

East.

However, at the time of the

collision, the stop sign regulating Defendant

#1403,

south.

southbound

(Transcript, Vol. II-R.
the

street,

restricting

(Transcript, Vol. III-R.

A homeowner near the intersection testified that the

missing stop sign had been gone for one or two days.

(Transcript, Vol. III-

R. #1709, lines 3-15; #1710, lines 1-14).
On January 14, 1991, the day before the collision, Pleasant Grove
sent a snow plow operator and city employee, David Frye, to "cinder" the
7

1100 North 500 East intersection.
# 1894, line 9).

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1893, line 22 to

It snowed the next day and Pleasant Grove again sent Mr.

Frye to plow 1100 North and the streets in that area.
R. # 1894, lines 14-19).

(Transcript, Vol. IV-

Although he could not remember his actions

specifically on those two days, Mr. Frye testified that in plowing the roads
he routinely would go through the 1100 North 500 East intersection six to
nine times.

(Transcript, Vol. V-R. #1928, lines 4-16 and #1931-33).

Under Pleasant Grove City's written policy, snow plow

operators

must "[b]e alert for any roads [sic] signs that are knocked down and make
sure they are put back up the same day."
line 12 to #1884, line 1).

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1183,

Mr. Frye had extensive knowledge of the city

signs as a snow plow operator and as the individual responsible
maintaining and repairing Pleasant Grove's signs.

for

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #

1875, line 11 to #1876, line 3; #1877, lines 11-18).
In addition to snow plow operators, the City charged
employees to watch for missing and damaged signs.
R.#1877, line 2 to #1878, line 23).
Ferre, testified

(Transcript, Vol. IV-

At trial, the chief of police, Michael

that in an average 24 hour period, police patrols

though 1100 North 500 East between three and nine times.
Vol. IV-R. # 1853, lines 5-14).
plowing

or

all of its

cindering,

pass

(Transcript,

Accordingly, on a day requiring snow

Pleasant

Grove

City

employees

with

the

responsibility to look for missing stop signs, drove through the intersection
where this collision occurred no less than nine and up to eighteen times.
Pleasant Grove City Police Chief agreed that the City expected to
identify

a downed

stop

sign within minutes

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1855, lines 2-15).

or hours

and

not

days.

Failure to find a missing stop

sign in that amount of time would mean the City's surveillance system had
8

been ineffective.

{Id.

at lines 16-19).

Pleasant Grove's Public Works

Director also agreed that under these conditions the City's system would
have failed.

(Transcript, Vol. V-R. # 1981, line 17 to #1982 line 4).

At

trial, Defendants' expert witness testified that the City did not fall below its
required standard of care.
2250, line 8).

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-R. # 2249, line 24 to #

Ms. Carrier's expert testified that it did.

(Transcript, Vol. V-

R. # 2013, lines 7-13).
Ms. Carrier filed

suit against Defendants

seeking to recover damages.

claiming negligence and

(Amended Complaint, R. 45).

Each of the

Defendants carried insurance from the same company, Farmer's Insurance,
which arranged for counsel.

(Transcript, Vol. II-R. # 1451, lines 2-7).

Defendant Smith and Defendant Pro-Tech initially had the same attorney.
Prior to trial, Defendant Smith changed his testimony and averred
that

his

employer,

Pro-Tech

concerning the accident.
line 1).

had

8-20).

him

to

alter

his

testimony

(Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1517, line 21 to #1518

Defendant Smith said that Pro-Tech wanted to place more blame

for the accident on Ms. Carrier.
25).

asked

(Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1519, lines 12-

Pro-Tech denied these charges.

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1827, lines

Consequently, Defendant Smith obtained separate counsel.
None of the Defendants filed cross claims against the others.

Nor did

the defenses offered seek to place blame on any of the other Defendants.
Accordingly, Ms. Carrier's counsel moved the trial court to limit

the

peremptory challenges granted so that each side of the controversy would
have the same amount.
The

court

(Exhibit 1, Motion, R 381).

denied

the

motion,

and

meted

out

challenges to Ms. Carrier while granting Defendants
(Exhibit 2, Transcript July 15, 1993).
9

four

peremptory

a total of twelve.

Ms. Carrier's counsel asked the court

to have Defendants

state for the record the nature and extent of their

adverse interests justifying
the request.

the additional challenges. The court

refused

(Id.).

On the first day of trial, while impaneling the jury, the court asked
that each party read the names of its witnesses to the potential jurors.
(Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1140).

After only one Defendant had introduced his

witnesses, the court concluded, without regard to the other
that all defense
#1166).

witnesses had been presented.

Defendants,

(Transcript,

Vol.

I-R.

In fact, Defendant Smith had no separate witnesses, and Pleasant

Grove City only had an additional one.

(Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166).

At trial, Ms. Carrier testified that she could not see Defendant Smith
approach the intersection since a tree and
her vision.
shrubbery

(Transcript,

bushes lining 500 East blocked

Vol. VI-R. #2058, lines 3-8).

blocked her view, Ms. Carrier

Because

the

stated that she did not

see

Defendant Smith until she was about to enter the intersection.
Vol. VI-R. #2057, lines 17-23).

Ms. Carrier's vehicle struck

Smith's van on the sliding door located behind the front
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1739, line 23 to #1740, line 1).

(Transcript,
Defendant

passenger door.

Ms. Carrier was to

the right of Defendant Smith.
All of the Defendants listed Newell Knight as an expert witness,
however failed to call him during trial.
R. #2439, line 22 to #2440, line 1).
Ms.

Carrier's

counsel

sought

to

impeachment and rebuttal purposes.
18-23).

(Transcript, Vol. I-R #1166; Vol. XAt the conclusion of Defendants' case,
use

Mr.

Knight's

deposition

for

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2438, lines

Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the court allowed Mr.

Knight to take the stand and testify.
14).
10

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2439, lines 5-

On direct examination, Ms. Carrier's counsel generally restricted Mr.
Knight to yes or no responses on what he stated at deposition.

That

testimony concerned the speed of the two vehicles (Transcript, Vol. X R.
#2453, line 12 to #2467 line 18) and individual reaction time.
Vol. X-R. #2467, line 21 to #2471, line 18).

(Transcript,

Defendant's cross examination,

however, invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law

(Transcript, Vol. X-R.

#2477, lines 21-23) and pointedly asked Mr. Knight which party had the
right of way.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18).

objected and the court overruled.

Ms. Carrier

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 8-14).

Ms. Carrier tendered a jury instruction on the right-of-way
quoting Utah Code Annotated, §

41-6-72(2).

(Exhibit 3).

statute,

This section

states that when two vehicles arrive at an uncontrolled intersection

at

approximately the same time, the vehicle on the left must yield the right
of way.

Defendants proffered Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(1), the "first

in time" rule.

Subsequently, the court instructed the jury using both

sections of the statute, over Ms. Carrier's objections.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R.

#2532, line 24 to 2533, line 17; #2538, lines 2-10).
The jury returned a verdict on August 24, 1992, finding

Shirley

Carrier 60% negligent, William Roger Smith 40% liable, and Pleasant Grove
City 0% at fault.

(Judgment on Jury Verdict, R. 815).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly

granted Defendants

twelve

peremptory

challenges based on a misreading of Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under

all

of

the

rule's

provisions,

peremptory challenges together.

co-parties

In Randle

must

v. Allen,

exercise

their

the Utah Supreme

Court interpreted this to mean that unless a substantial controversy exists
1 1

between the parties they are not entitled to additional sets of challenges.
862 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1993).

A substantial controversy occurs when

the parties file non-derivative cross claims against each other.

Id. at 1333.

In this case, none of the Defendants filed any cross claims.

Moreover,

none of the facts prove a substantial controversy between the Defendants.
Therefore,

the

court

committed

reversible

error

when

it

granted

Defendants eight more peremptory challenges than given to Ms. Carrier.
The Ran die

Court

warned

that

granting

one

side

too

many

peremptory challenges allows it to unfairly shape the jury to its advantage.
862 P.2d at 1334.
case to do just that.

Eight additional challenges enabled Defendants in this
The clear weight of the evidence demonstrated that

Defendant Pleasant Grove City acted negligently in failing to discover and
replace a stop sign down for one to two days.
that the City was 0% negligent.

Nonetheless, the jury found

Because substantial evidence does not

support that verdict, the Court should grant Ms. Carrier a new trial.
A party is entitled to have her theory of the case presented to the
jury in a clear and understandable way.
238

(Utah

1991).

Accordingly,

jury

State v. Hamilton,
instructions

827 P.2d 232,

which

present

the

applicable law in a confused or incorrect manner should be reversed.

In

this case, Ms. Carrier offered an instruction which quoted directly from the
applicable Utah statute and correctly set out the governing law.

The court

paraphrased the law and combined it with Defendants' instruction, thereby
misleading the jury.
Finally, the court improperly allowed expert witness Newell Knight to
take the stand, testify outside the scope of direct examination, and to offer
legal conclusions.

Defendants designated and retained Mr. Knight as an

expert witness and then declined to call him at trial presumably because
12

his deposition testimony agreed with Plaintiff's

expert witness.

At the

conclusion of Defendants' case, Ms. Carrier offered Mr. Knight's deposition
for rebuttal and impeachment purposes.
The court overruled Ms. Carrier's objections, allowed Mr. Knight to
take the stand, and then to testify on matters outside the material read
from fhe deposition.

In the course of his testimony, Mr. Knight referred to

the Utah traffic code as a foundation for his opinion that Defendant Smith
had the right-of-way at the intersection.

Mr. Knight's legal conclusions fall

outside permissible testimony under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704.
Davidson

v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826

P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (The rule does not allow a witness to give legal
conclusions).

Because

the

court

abused

its

discretion

in

improperly

allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand and testify, the case ought to be
reversed

and

remanded.

ARGUMENT
Point 1: The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When It Granted
Defendants Twelve Peremptory Challenges.
When Plaintiff/Appellant

Ms. Carrier raised the issue of peremptory

challenges, the trial court announced that it would give each
three challenges plus one for the alternate juror.
Ms. Carrier's

objections,

the four peremptory

(Exhibit 2).
challenges

Plaintiff competed against Defendants' total of twelve.

Defendant
In spite of

doled out to

The first issue in

this appeal is whether the trial court erred in exceeding the

statutory

number of challenges awarded to a party.
A. The trial court erred in failing to comply with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47.

13

A careless reading of Rule 47 might lead a court into mistakenly
granting four peremptory challenges to every party in a multiple party
case.

Rule 47(e) provides that "[e]ach party shall be entitled to three

peremptory challenges except as provided under Subdivisions (b) and (c)
of this rule."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (1992).

Subdivision

(b) of the rule allows the court to give each party in the lawsuit an
additional peremptory challenge to use against those called for
jury duty.

alternate

Id.

However, when there are several parties on either side, Rule 47(c)
restricts the grant in subsections (b) and (e).
parties on one side "must join
(emphasis added).

in a challenge before it can be made."

of the controversy receives only one set of

challenges.

Utah case law confirms this interpretation.
1329,

Id.

Therefore, under the most reasonable interpretation of

the entire rule, each side
peremptory

It states that the multiple

1333

(Utah

1993)

(Refusing

to

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d

grant

additional

peremptory

challenges to co-parties unless they are truly adverse); Sutton

v. Otis, 68

Utah 85, 141, 249 P. 437, 457 (1926) (same).
747, 752 (1970)("Generally

See also, Annot. 32 A.L.R.3d

speaking, a statute which allows a

specific

number of peremptory challenges to 'each party' . . . has been construed to
permit a single set of peremptory challenges. . . .").
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the general rule.

Rather,

over Ms. Carrier's objections, it awarded Defendants additional challenges
as if each Defendant were a separate side of the lawsuit.
suggested

that

Defendants

relate

for

the

record

When Ms. Carrier
why

they

merited

additional peremptories, the court stated that it saw no need to have them
do so.

(Exhibit 2, at 2, lines 8-10).
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B.
The trial court erred in granting each Defendant four
peremptory challenges when no cross claims had been filed.
Under Utah law, co-parties may obtain additional sets of peremptory
challenges only under specific circumstances.
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
granted

Recently, in Randle v. Allen,

"[EJxtra peremptory challenges should be

to multiple parties only

if there is a 'substantial

between them respecting the subject-matter of the suit.'"
1332 (Utah 1993) (emphasis zdded)quoting

controversy

862 P.2d 1329,

Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85,141,

249 P. 437, 457 (1926).
What is a substantial controversy within the context of Rule 47?
Randle

The

Court spoke unequivocally when it stated that "In our view a

'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a
cross-claim

against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct

lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs

and

defendants."

Id. (emphasis added).
In

order

peremptory
against

for

the

challenges

each

other.

trial

court

to

award

more

than

one

to a side, the co-parties must file
Moreover,

derivative of the original claims.

the
Id.

cross-claims

set

cross-claims

cannot

be

merely

That is, the cross-claims will not

create additional sets of challenges if they only seek indemnification
contribution.
trial

court

peremptory
C.

In this case, Defendants filed no cross-claims.
erred

when it awarded

of

Defendants

more

than

or

Therefore, the
one

set of

challenges.

Defendants lack substantial controversy

Because Defendants filed no cross-claims against each other, under
the holding in Randle

they do not merit additional peremptory challenges.
15

Defendants

may

nonetheless

attempt

argue

that

a

"substantial

Even if the Court rules, despite Randle1 s

controversy" exists between them.
unambiguous

to

language, that a substantial controversy can exist

without

cross-claims, the facts in this case simply do not support Defendants' claim.
In Randle

v. Allen, Carl Allen's pickup truck struck Rosan Randle's

car, resulting in her death.

Mrs. Randle's husband sued Allen for negligent

operation of his truck, and UDOT and Salt Lake County for negligently
designing and maintaining the intersection.

862 P.2d at 1332.

For his

injuries, Defendant Allen cross-claimed against UDOT and the County, also
alleging

that

maintained.

the

intersection

been

negligently

designed

and

Id, at 1333.

As in this case, the Randle
three

had

peremptory

challenges

trial court allowed each party to exercise

as well

as one

additional

challenge

for

alternate jurors.

Like the facts here, the plaintiff had four

peremptory

challenges

the three

a total

twelve.

while

Id, at 1132.

defendants

collectively

wielded

of

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants

with their extra peremptory challenges were able to shape the jury to
their advantage.

Id,

In reviewing the case, the Utah Supreme Court noted that defendant
Allen's separate lawsuit against the other defendants aligned his interests
in choosing the jurors with both the plaintiff and the other defendants.
at 1333.

Id,

Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted Allen the

additional challenges.

Id, at 1334.

On the other hand, UDOT and the County retained the same interests
in defending against both suits.

Id,

at 1333.

aptly fits Defendants in this case, the Randle
interests

linking

the

two

defendants
16

Indeed, in language that

Court described the common

together.

It

emphasized

that

"[n]either made a claim for damages against the other or against Randle or
Allen."

Id.

Moreover, "[b]oth asserted that Allen and Mrs. Randle were the

proximate cause of the injuries."

Id.

In addition, "they had common

interests in defending the claims against them."

Id.

Therefore, the Court

ruled that UDOT and the County should not have been given an additional
set of challenges.

Id. at 1334.

In this case, like UDOT and Salt Lake County in Randle,
clearly operated under common interests.
filed no cross-claims.

As already emphasized,

they

In addition, the only defense theory put forth was

Ms. Carrier's alleged negligence.
Defendant

Defendants

Pleasant Grove City did not argue that

Smith contributed to the accident; nor did Smith claim that

Defendant Pleasant Grove's failure to replace the stop sign contributed.
In fact, this case is stronger than Randle
additional common interests.

because Defendants

have

For example, two of the three Defendants

worked for the same company.

These two Defendants initially had the

same attorney counseling them in this case.

Moreover, the same insurance

company carried coverage on each Defendant and it hired the attorneys
representing

them.

Defendants

might

argue that a disagreement

between

Smith and Pro-Tech concerning the accident report creates
This argument fails for two reasons.

First, Randle

controversy between co-parties be "substantial."

Defendants
controversy.

requires that the

862 P.2d at 1332-33.

This means that refusing to cooperate, attempting to shift liability to each
other, resting defenses or claims on different sets of facts, or resorting to
different legal theories simply is not enough.
the co-parties

does

not create

a substantial

Id.

Even hostility between

controversy.

Id.

Here,

Defendant Smith's averments that Defendant Pro-Tech instructed him to
17

lie,

and

Pro-Tech's

denials,

do not rise

to the

level

of

substantial

controversy.
Second,

the

controversy

must

effectually

put

different sides of the lawsuit, making them adversaries.
In Randle,

the

co-parties

on

862 P.2d at 1333.

the Court held that defendant Allen's allegations that the other

two defendants proximately caused his own injuries placed him in direct
opposition.

Id.

By contrast, in this case, Defendant Smith's allegations and

Defendant Pro-Tech's denials did not even cause a change in courtroom
tactics.

Specifically,

both relied

on the

same

theory

and

the

same

witnesses.
Although Ms. Carrier raised the issue of peremptory challenges with
the trial court
proving
Moreover,

that

several
they

times, Defendants

operated

on

the trial court refused

adverseness for the record.

different

have yet to offer
sides

in

this

to require Defendants

any

facts

controversy.
to state

their

Because Defendants are linked by common

interests, "the trial court should have required [Defendants] to act jointly in
exercising the three peremptory challenges allowed a side."

862 P.2d at

1333.
D.
The trial court committed reversible error in
Defendants twelve peremptory challenges.

awarding

The Utah Supreme Court has warned that, when awarding additional
sets of peremptory challenges, a judge "must carefully appraise the degree
of adverseness among co-parties."

Randle,

862 P.2d at 1333.1 As

Randle

1 The trial court must evaluate the adverseness of co-parties without relying on how the
parties might characterize their interests. Therefore, even though at the hearing counsel for
Ms. Carrier did not dispute Defendant Pleasant Grove City's adverseness, the appellate court
should independently decide whether any of the Defendants merited additional sets of
peremptories.
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explains, granting one side of the case additional challenges disadvantages
the opposing side.

Id.

The disadvantage is particularly egregious when a

large disparity exists in the number of challenges awarded to each side.
Id.
In this case, the trial court gave no indication that it
weighed the Defendants' adverseness.

carefully

Responding to Ms. Carrier's motion

to limit the peremptories, the court merely stated, "I feel that they are
disparate enough, just by the nature of the case, to permit [granting the
additional challenges]."

(Exhibit 2, at 2, lines 8-10).

Yet, the record reflects

that the court did not see Defendants as truly adverse.
While impaneling the jury, the court asked that each party
names of its witnesses to the potential jurors.
#1140).

read the

(Transcript, Vol.

I-R.

After only one Defendant had introduced his witnesses, the court

concluded,

without

regard

to

the

witnesses had been presented.
saw Defendants as a unit.

other

Defendants,

that

(Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166).

all

defense

The court

And, Defendants apparently acted as a u n i t -

Defendant Smith had no separate witnesses and Pleasant Grove City only
had an additional one.
Without
additional
advantage."

(Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166).

a substantial

challenges

have

controversy
the

between

"opportunity

862 P.2d at 1334.

to

them,
shape

co-parties
the jury

with
to

its

In such cases, the Utah Supreme Court

holds that prejudicial error occurs.

No actual prejudice need be shown.

Id.

In Ran die,

and

the

the

Court

reversed

remanded

defendants received four extra challenges.

the

case

because

In this case, the disparity is

twice as large; the trial court allowed Defendants eight more challenges.
Accordingly, Plaintiff/Appellant

Ms. Carrier respectfully requests the Utah

Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial.
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Point 2: The Jury Erred in Finding Defendant Pleasant Grove City 0%
Negligent.
At the trial's conclusion, the jury, shaped by Defendants'

additional

peremptory challenges, returned a verdict finding Pleasant Grove City 0%
negligent.

It reached this result in spite of testimony by Pleasant Grove

employees that the City had failed.
whether

Defendants

presented

The second issue in this appeal is

'"substantial

evidence

. . . adequate

convince a reasonable mind to support [the jury verdict]. '"

Mountain

to
Fuel

Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 861 P.2d 414, 428 (Utah
1993) quoting First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of

Equalization

of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
A. Marshaling the evidence
Plaintiff/Appellant Ms. Carrier sued Pleasant Grove City claiming that
it was negligent in failing to timely discover and replace a stop sign.
Utah law, negligence means the failure to use reasonable care.
Jury Inst. 3.2, April 15, 1991.

Under

Model Utah

Evidence supporting the jury's verdict that

Pleasant Grove was not negligent is as follows:
1.

City Police Officer Randy Shepherd testified that on the day of the

accident the City had had a "lot of accidents that day."
R.#1443, lines 9-19).

He also testified

(Transcript, Vol. II-

that when receiving

numerous

police calls, the officers patrol less and may not drive through every street
during the day.
Officer

(Transcript, Vol. II-R.#1446, lines 15-23).

In addition,

Shepherd doubted whether he would have driven up 1100 North

on the day of the accident unless there was an accident or police call.
(Transcript, Vol. II-R.#1447, lines 15-23).
2.

Pleasant Grove City Police Chief, Michael Ferre, testified similarly
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that a snowstorm limits patrolling.

(Transcript, Vol. III-R.#1865, lines 11-

17).
3.

Pleasant Grove "sign man" and snow plow operator, David Frye

stated on days with heavy snowstorms that not all of the streets would be
plowed.

(Transcript, Vol. V-R.#1937, lines 6-8).

Mike Mills, Public Works

Director also testified that on the day of the collision it was unlikely that
the snow plow crew would have covered the entire city.

(Transcript, Vol.

V-R.#1991, lines 17-25).
4.

J. Bruce Reading, Ms. Carrier's expert witness, said that a

"gracious" standard allows a city 24 hours to receive notification of a
downed stop sign.
5.

(Transcript, Vol. V-R.#2016, lines 5-23).

C. Arthur Guerts, Pleasant Grove's expert witness, claimed that

Pleasant Grove's actions regarding the stop sign were within the accepted
standard of care.

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2250, lines 1-8).

He also

testified that any city's surveillance system is imperfect but that it will
recognize a downed stop sign "within a day or two or three, perhaps even
four."

Any time longer than that would be too long.

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-

R.#2250, lines 11-24).
B. The jury lacked sufficient evidence in deciding that Pleasant
Grove City was 0% negligent.
A jury verdict must be overturned if it lacks sufficient evidence to
support it.
1989).

Reid v. Mutual

Legal sufficiency

of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
derives from Rule 52 (a) which provides that

findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
784 P.2d 1176, 1178

(Utah 1989).

Bradley,

A clearly erroneous finding is one that

is against the clear weight of the evidence.
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Doelle v.

Id.

In this case,

finding that

Pleasant Grove City had 0% fault in a collision involving a stop sign missing
for one to two days is against the clear weight of the evidence.
The evidence and inferences
liability falls in two areas.

supporting Pleasant Grove's lack of

First, city employees testified that they might

not have driven through the intersection the day of the accident

and

therefore would not have had an opportunity to look for the downed sign.
Moreover, David Frye, the City "sign man" and snow plow operator for
1100 North and 500 East, could not specifically remember if he plowed the
intersection and surrounding roads that day.
The clear weight of the evidence, however, proves that Mr. Frye had
plowed the intersection and neighboring roads.

His boss,

Dennis Carter,

Pleasant Grove Street Superintendent, stated that when he drove to the
intersection at the time of the collision he saw that both 1100 North and
500 East had been plowed.
line 8).

(Transcript, Vol. V-R.#1961, line 17 to #1962,

Based on Mr. Frye's own testimony of how he typically plows those

streets, he had been through the intersection at least six to nine times
prior to the collision.
33).

(Transcript Vol. V-R. #1928, lines 4-16 and #1931-

If the stop sign had been down for two days then Mr.

Frye's

assignment to cinder the roads on January 14, 1992 would have taken him
through the intersection four more times.
passed

the missing

With both days, he would have

stop sign ten to thirteen times.

Any other

city

employee driving on 1100 North, a busy collector road, or 500 East, would
simply add to that number.
The second area of Pleasant Grove's evidence comes from
witness C. Arthur Guerts.
met

the

necessary

expert

Mr. Guerts claimed that Pleasant Grove City had

standard

of

care.

Basing

his

testimony

on

his

experience with other communities, he argued that a city may reasonably
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take up to four days to locate and replace a downed stop sign.
Mr. Guerts' testimony, however, has several fatal flaws.

First he

asserts that in applying the four-day standard, it makes no difference how
many times city employees travel past the missing stop sign.
Vol. VIII-R.#2272, line 21 to #2273, line 18).

(Transcript,

Under Mr. Guerts' standard,

therefore, a city employee could drive through the intersection every hour,
indeed every minute, and the city would not fall below the standard of
care until four days had passed.

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2276, lines 13-

21. Testifying that the number of times through the intersection

is "not

relevant.").
Mr. Guerts refused

to budge from

this position, even though he

admitted that each time an employee drove the intersection, the City had
another opportunity to discover the downed sign.
R.#2284, line 12 to #2288, line 7).

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-

He also admitted that under the

circumstances he would be critical of Mr. Frye, the snow plow operator and
sign man.

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2288, line 18 to #2289, line 4).

In

fact, he would take corrective measures against Mr. Frye for his failure to
discover the stop sign after passing through the intersection
times.

so many

(Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2290, line 4 to #2291 line 16).

Mr.

Guerts' admissions belie his standard; the number of times employees pass
the downed stop sign does become relevant.
Second, Pleasant Grove City employees themselves do not agree with
Mr. Guerts' assessment of the City's action on the missing sign.

Thus,

Public Works Director Mills acknowledged that if the sign had been down
several days, the City's surveillance system would have failed.
Vol. V-R.#1981, line 17 to #1982 line 4).

(Transcript,

Furthermore, Chief of Police

Ferre emphasized that he expected the City to identify a missing stop sign
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in minutes or hours and not days.
Finally,

expert

witness

J.

testimony given by Mr. Guerts.
times City employees

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R.#1855, line 2-9).
Bruce

Reading

should have been aware of the missing sign.

the intersection,

the

City

(Transcript, Vol. V-R. #2013,

Failure to discover the downed stop sign meant

the City acted below the accepted standard of care.
#2013, lines 7-13).

contradicted

He testified that given the number of

actually went through

line 14 to #2014, line 11).

directly

Transcript, Vol. V-R.

Mr. Reading emphasized the City's failure even if the

stop sign had only been down one day.

(Transcript, Vol. V-R. #2016, lines

10-23).
In reviewing the evidence supporting a jury verdict, the appellate
court does not confirm on the basis of some evidence.
Peterson,

818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991).

decision must be supported by substantial evidence.

See Peterson

v.

Rather the jury's

Reeves v. Gentile 813

P.2d 111, 114-15 (Utah 1991) quoting Seybold v. Union Pacific R.R., 121
Utah 61, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951).

In this case, Pleasant Grove City failed

to provide sufficient evidence that it had 0% negligence.
Carrier respectfully

Accordingly, Ms.

requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and

remand the case.
Point 3: The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give the Right-of-Way. Jury
Instruction Offered by Ms. Carrier.
" The well recognized general rule entitles a party to have his theory
of the case submitted to the jury."
(Utah 1981)

Watters

v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458

citing Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 141, 140 P.2d 772 (1943).

Moreover, the trial court must instruct the jury on the party's theory in a
"clear and understandable way."
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State

v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 238

(Utah

1991).

Watters,

Failure to meet these requirements is prejudicial

error.

626 P.2d at 458.

In this case, Ms. Carrier presented evidence that she and Defendant
Smith arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time.

Expert

witness Rudolph Limpert testified that Ms. Carrier was approximately 66
feet from the intersection when she first saw Defendant Smith's vehicle.
(Transcript,

Vol.

IV-R.

#1752,

lines

21-25).

approximately 53 feet away at that point in time.
#1753, lines 15-16).

Defendant

Smith

was

(Transcript, Vol. IV-R.

Ms. Carrier testified that because

shrubbery lining

500 East blocked her view, she did not see Defendant Smith until she was
about to enter the intersection.

(Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2057, lines 17-23).

Consequently, Ms. Carrier collided with Defendant Smith's van, hitting the
sliding door located behind the front

passenger door and establishing that

Defendant Smith entered the intersection only tenths of a second before.
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1739, line 23 to #1740, line 1).

Ms. Carrier was to

the right of Defendant Smith.
At the conclusion of trial, Ms. Carrier requested the trial court give
the jury the following instruction:
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-672(2) provides:
when more than one vehicle enters or
approaches an intersection from different highways at
approximately the same time [and] the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control
device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control is
inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left will yield the rightof-way to the operator on the right unless otherwise directed
by a peace officer.
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If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that
William Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation
of the foregoing statute, such conduct creates a presumption of
negligence.
(Exhibit 3).
This instruction quotes the statute and fairly instructs the jury as to
Ms.

Carrier's

theory

of

the

case:

(1) Both

intersection at approximately the same time;

drivers

arrived

(2) from Defendant

at

the

Smith's

perspective the intersection was unregulated because "the traffic-control
inoperative";

and

(3)

Ms.

Carrier

was

to

Defendant

Therefore, Defendant Smith had to yield the right-of-way.

Smith's

is

right.

Moreover, from

Ms. Carrier's perspective, the intersection was not unregulated.

Relying on

years of driving 1100 North and Ms. Carrier knew that she had the rightof-way

because

traffic

on

500 East,

including

Defendant

Smith,

was

restricted by stop signs.
Defendants

argued, however that the jury ought to be given a

paraphrase of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(1).
that

the

driver

entering

the

intersection

first

This section provides
has

the

right-of-way.

Although this instruction may present Defendants' theory of the case, it
fails

to

different

recognize

that

the

drivers

approached

the

intersection

with

statuses and obligations.

Rather

than

give

Ms.

Carrier's

requested

instruction,

the

paraphrased it and combined it with the one Defendants offered:
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at
approximately the same time and distance from it, the driver
approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the
duty of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-ofway.
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-ofway.
However, a driver may not speed up to enter an
26

court

intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by
entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver.
In
order for a driver approaching from the left to take the rightof-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of
the driver approaching from the right.
(Exhibit 4, Jury Instruction No. 31, R. 781).
Although

the

court

gave

Ms.

Carrier's

instruction

in

part,

by

combining it with Defendants' theory of the case, it failed to instruct the
jury

on

Hamilton,

Ms.

Carrier's

theory

827 P.2d at 238.

in

a "clear

and

understandable

way."

Moreover, the court's instruction tended to

mislead the jury as to the law applicable in this fact situation.
v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987).

See

Biswell

It simply did not allow for

Ms. Carrier's state of mind, or that for more than twenty years traffic on
1100 North had the right-of-way.

Accordingly, Ms. Carrier

respectfully

requests the Utah Court of Appeals reverse and remand the case.

Point 4: The Trial Court Erred by Allowing Newell Knight to Improperly
Testify.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party can use a
deposition for "any purpose permitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence."
Rule 32(1) (1992).

Furthermore, Utah's evidence rules state that "[t]he

credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. . . ."
Evidence, Rule 607 (1992).

Utah Rules of

Pursuant to these two rules, Ms. Carrier sought

to have Newell Knight's deposition read into the record.

(Transcript, Vol.

X-R. #2438, lines 18-23).
Defendants listed Newell Knight as an expert witness, and allowed
Ms. Carrier to depose him prior to trial.
22 to #2440, line 2).

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2439, line

While taking Mr. Knight's deposition, counsel for Ms.
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Carrier discovered that Mr. Knight agreed almost completely with Ms.
Carrier's expert accident reconstruction witness, Rudolph Limpert, Ph.D.
(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2458, line 1 to #2461, line 11).

Although they

continued to hold out the possibility of using Mr. Knight during trial, not
surprisingly

Defendants

declined

to call him

Defendants called Paul Thomas Blotter.

as a witness.

Instead,

(Transcript, Vol. VII-R. #2114, line

10-13).
At the conclusion of Defendants' case, Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted
to introduce the deposition of Defendants' own witness, Newell Knight.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32(1).
deposition

to

impeach

Defendants'

Defendants' case in general.

Ms. Carrier intended to use the

expert

witness,

Dr.

Blotter,

and

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 607; (Transcript,

Vol. X-R. #2438, lines 18-23).

Defendants had retained an expert who

agreed with Ms. Carrier's version of the facts and then attempted to hide
him from the jury.

Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the court

allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand and testify.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R.

#2439, lines 5-14).
On direct examination, Ms. Carrier's counsel generally restricted Mr.
Knight to yes or no responses as to what he stated at deposition. That
testimony concerned the speed of the two vehicles (Transcript, Vol. X-R.
#2453, line 12 to #2467 line 18) and individual reaction time.
Vol. X-R. #2467, line 21 to #2471, line 18).

(Transcript,

Defendant's cross examination,

however, invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law (Transcript, Vol. X-R.
#2477, lines 21-23) and pointedly asked Mr. Knight which party had the
right of way.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18).

objected and the court overruled.

Ms. Carrier

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 8-14).

The court erred first by allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand instead
28

of simply allowing his deposition to be read to the jury, as permitted by
Rule 32(1) URCP; and secondly, by permitting him to testify outside the
scope

of

direct

examination.

Rule

611(b)

states

in

uncompromising

language: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting

the credibility of the witness."

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 611 (1992).

As the Utah Supreme Court

emphasizes, an expert witness on cross-examination properly speaks on
those matters opened up in direct examination.

Whitehead

v.

American

Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1990).
While Rule 611 allows the court some latitude in ruling on crossexamination, generally the court should restrict questions to the issues
raised on direct.
Moreover,

State

v.

Jerrell,

608 P.2d

218, 228

(Utah

1980).

the court must keep a certain amount of control over

the

discussion and not allow counsel to conduct a "fishing expedition" into any
matter that might appear in the witness' deposition.

State v. Clayton,

658

P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983).
The court attempted to justify its ruling allowing Defendants to lead
Mr. Knight into areas completely unrelated to direct examination.
explained

that it had permitted

examinations.
However,

all

witnesses

in

both parties

to exceed

the

It

scope of

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2525, line 9 to #2526, line 1).
prior

instances

the respective

referred
parties'

to
cases

by

the

court

in chief.

had

involved

Defendants

had

deliberately waived their right to call Mr. Knight; they specifically chose
not to raise the right-of-way

issue in their case.

By overruling

Ms.

Carrier's objection, the court granted Defendants impermissible license to
question the rebuttal witness.
The court also erred in allowing Mr. Knight to give legal conclusions.
29

Utah courts have repeatedly rejected attempts by expert witness to testify
on questions of law.

See e.g. Davidson

v. Prince,

813 P.2d 1225, 1231

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

In Davidson,

this

same Newell Knight appearing as an expert witness attempted to testify
that an individual was negligent.

In upholding the trial court's rejection of

Mr. Knight's attempts the Utah Court of Appeals noted that Rule 704
abolishes the per se rule against testimony on ultimate issues of fact. 813
P.2d at 1231.
opinions.

Id.

However, the Court emphasized, the rule does not allow all
Specifically, the rule does not permit a witness to answer

questions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach.
does it tolerate legal conclusions.

Id.

Nor

Id.

In this case Mr. Knight referred to the Utah traffic code and then,
over Ms. Carrier's objections, stated that Defendant Smith had the right of
way.

(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18).

offered

a legal conclusion,

testimony

Because Mr. Knight

telling the jury what result to reach,

should not have been allowed.

Nor should the court

his
have

permitted Mr. Knight to testify outside the scope of direct examination.
Nor should the court have allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand as all that
counsel requested was to read portions of Mr. Knight's deposition to the
jury. Accordingly

Ms. Carrier respectfully

requests the Utah Court of

Appeals to reverse and remand this case.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing to follow the guidelines given in
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993).

Because Defendants obtained

three times as many peremptories as Ms. Carrier, they had the opportunity
to shape the jury to their advantage.
30

Not surprisingly, then, the jury

found, against the clear weight of the evidence, that Defendant Pleasant
Grove City was 0% negligent.

The court additionally erred in conducting an

eleven-day trial over thirty-nine days, failing to submit Ms. Carrier's
proposed jury instruction

on the right-of-way,

witness Newell Knight to improperly testify.

and allowing

rebuttal

Accordingly, Ms. Carrier

respectfully requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and remand this
case.
DATED this

1^1

day of

r

^AqaavlU1995-

c
LYNN C.HARRIS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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EXHIBIT 1
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF THE
DEFENDANTS' PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

LYNN C. HARRIS (1382)
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200-B
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone:

375-0524

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
Plaintiff,
LIMIT THE NUMBER OF THE
DEFENDANTS' PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
vs.
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM and
ROGER SMITH,

Civil No. 910400680
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendants.
—000O000--

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, and pursuant to the
local rules, hereby files a motion limiting rhe defendants' number of
peremptory challenges.

At the recent pretrial conference in this

matter when this issue was raised with the Court, the Court stated
that it was inclined to allow the plaintiff to have three peremptory
challenges and since there were three defendants, to allow them a
total of nine peremptory challenges.
The purpose of this motion is to bring to the Court's attention
the inherent unfairness and disparity between the parties if the

defendants are allowed to join together and have triple the number
of peremptories allocated to the lone plaintiff.

Specifically, it is the

plaintiffs request that either the plaintiff be given an identical
number of peremptory challenges as the defendants or to have the
number of the peremptory challenges of the defendants reduced to
equal the number allowed to plaintiff.

Whether this be three, six or

nine, it is plaintiffs position that the peremptory challenges must be
reasonable in number and approximately equal between the two
sides.

I.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
Challenge to individual jurors:
Number
of peremptory challenges.
The challenges
to individual jurors are either peremptory or
for cause.
Each party shall be entitled to
three peremptory challenges, except as
provided under subsections (b) and (c) of this
rule.
(b)

Alternative

jurors. . . .

(c)
Challenge to find; by whom made.
A challenge is an objection made to the trial
jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or
(2) to the individual juror. Either party may
challenge the jurors but where there are

2

individual parties on either side they must
join in a challenge before it can be made.
At first blush, one may assume that "each party" would require
three peremptories allowed to the plaintiff and three each to the
defendants for a total of nine.

However, a review of the limited case

law it changes that initial assumption.
At 32 ALR 3rd. 747, "Jury:

Number of Peremptory Challenges

Allowable In Civil Case Where There Are More Than Two Parties
Involved" contains an exhaustive collection of different state cases
dealing with the number of peremptory challenges allowable and
civil cases where there are more than two parties involved.

Upon

review of that annotation there are eighteen states which require the
collective exercising of challenges.

Under these states and their case

law, each side gets only a limited

number of challenges despite the

number of parties.

There are fifteen jurisdictions of the view where

the interest of the parties are adverse, each party gets the full
number of challenges.

Only two states, Connecticut and Tennessee,

require the plaintiff(s) and or the defendant(s) to join in their
challenges no matter whether there interests are adverse.
Under statutes similar to Utah's, nine jurisdictions require
joinder.

Some of these statutes are interpreted by case law to allow

extra challenges, Utah is one such state.
Company,

In Sutton v. Otis

Elevator

68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (Utah 1926), the Court construed

"each party" to mean each defendant where the defendant's interests
3

were antagonistic.

In Sutton, plaintiffs were injured in a hotel

elevator incident.

Plaintiff sued the hotel and the elevator company.

The elevator company wanted three challenges of its own because it
claimed adverse interest to the hotel.

The Court reviewed the record

and arguments of counsel and came to the conclusion that the
defendant's interests were antagonistic.

The Court held that it was

not the intent of the legislature to require clearly adverse parties to
join in peremptory challenges.

The language used by the Court is

instructive:
"There are no doubt many cases where the
defendants are joined, in which one seeks to
blame the other for the wrong or injury of
which the plaintiff complains. In such cases
there is no substantial reason why the
defendants, for purposes of a peremptory
challenge, should not be considered as being
on the same side.
But where the record
indisputably shows that one defendant
practically admits its own liability, and
whether it admits it or not, substantial
grounds appear for such admission, and
where it further appears that such party is
seeking to establish liability against the other
as a foundation for recoupment of damages
for breach of contract against the codefendant, it is an unblushing travesty to hold
that both parties are on the same side of the
controversy in the sense intended by the
statute in question. . . . No right thinking man
will contend that the hotel company did not
have the right to seek to charge the elevator
company with the wrong complained of, if it
4

believe the elevator company was responsible
for the injury; but that is not the question
here. The question is: Were they both on the
same side within the meaning of the statute? .
. . The statutes which requires the 'parties on
either side to join' should only be regarded as
a precaution to the trial court to see that the
right of severance in challenges shall not be
permitted, except in cases where it is
manifest from the very nature of the case
that even-handed justice requires it."
Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co,., 249 P. 437, 458 (Utah 1926).
After a diligent search, the plaintiff has been unable to find
additional cases on this issue since the 1926 Sutton

announcement.

In fact, the plaintiff could only find once that Sutton had been cited
by an Alaska court in 1954.
Plaintiff submits that it is helpful to review the State of
Wyoming's statute and case law on this point.

The Wyoming

Supreme Court interpreted a Wyoming statute W.S. 1977 Section 111-202 in Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyoming 1981) as follows:
In determining whether multiple defendants
constitute one side, consideration must be
given to the nature of the claim against them
and to whether defendant's interests are or
may be antagonistic." at 171.
In applying this language to the facts in Distad, the Wyoming
Supreme Court found the defendant's interest were adverse.

Distad,

involves a medical malpractice case with separate acts of negligence
attributed to each defendant.

5

In applying the general rule of consideration in Sutton to the
current facts, it is clear that the plaintiff has sued three separate
parties.

The plaintiff has sued William Roger Smith, the van operator

and the employee of Pro-Tech Restoration dba Stone Carpets.

In

addition to these two parties, the plaintiff has also commenced action
and filed a claim against the City of Pleasant Grove due to their
failure to appropriately maintain it's streets, roadways, and signage.
It is the plaintiffs position that although all three parties1 interest
are adverse to the plaintiff, that they are not necessarily adverse to
each other.

The most obvious element of this is the employee and

employer relationship.

It is clear that the employee was in the scope

and course of his employment at the time of the facts and
circumstances of this collision.

In fact, Mr. Jeffs initially represented

both Pro-Tech Restoration and William Roger Smith in this matter.

It

would seem immensely unfair and inequitable to allow a total of six
peremptory challenges for the employer and the employee
defendants in this collision litigation.
It is also clear that Pleasant Grove's interests are antagonistic
to the plaintiff in the same identical manner as the defendant driver
and employer.

It is the plaintiffs intention to seek relief from both

entities, both the City as well as Pro-Tech Restoration and it's
employee.

The plaintiff will leave it to each respective defendant to

point out what, if any, adverse interests they may have between the

6

City and the carpet company in addition to the general adverse
interest to the plaintiff,

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff submits that unless the defendants can show they
are each antagonistic to each other's interest, that they should not be
allowed three separate peremptories each.

It is the plaintiffs

intention to have their numbers reduced to at least six, and hopefully
three.

In the alternative, the plaintiff would be willing to have the

total defendants' peremptories reduced to six and allow the plaintiff
to have an equal number of peremptories.
DATED this

day of

nvrv^

LYNN C.HARRIS
Attorney for Plaintiff

7

1993.

MATTINO CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing on this _23

day of

Jix»c<—
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John Chipman
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
Robert L. Moody
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2525 N. Canyon Road
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EXHIBIT 2
TRANSCRIPT, JULY 15, 1993

1

1

THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1993

2

(IN CHAMBERS PRIOR TO TRIAL)

3

THE COURT:

WE'RE MEETING IN CHAMBERS.

AND

4

THE COURT HAS INDICATED ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,

5

PLUS THE SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES, THAT THAT

6

MOTION IS DENIED.

7

THE NEXT WAS A MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS'

8

NUMBER OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

9

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PREEMPTORIES PERMITTED BY THE

10

PLAINTIFF.

11

TO COUNSEL THAT I AM GOING TO HAVE ONE ALTERNATE JUROR.

12

AND IF YOU ALL WANT FOUR PREEMPTORIES I'LL GIVE YOU ALL

13

FOUR, BUT OTHERWISE, ONLY UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

14
15

I'M GOING TO DENY THAT MOTION, BUT INDICATE

WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO?

DO YOU WANT FOUR FOR

A PREEMPTORY?

16

MR. HARRIS:

THREE PLUS ONE?

I THINK SO.

17

YOUR HONOR, WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE -- I

18

DON'T KNOW IF YOU LOOKED AT THAT CASE WE QUOTED ABOUT HOW

19

T H E R E ' S G O T TO BE A D I S P A R A T E

20

THERE —

21

CITY HAS DISPARATE INTERESTS, BUT I'M A LITTLE INTERESTED

22

IN HOW SMITH AND STONE HAVE DISPARATE INTERESTS.

23

JEFFS' RESPONSE WAS JUST THEY -- NO RESPONSE.

24

ALONG THE LINES IF THERE'S GOING TO BE GROUNDS FOR HAVING

25

EQUAL PREEMPTORIES EACH, I AT LEAST OUGHT TO HAVE THE

INTEREST SITUATION

AND I CLEARLY WILL NOT DISPUTE PLEASANT

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

IN
GROVE

AND MR.

SOMEWHERE

2

1

OPPORTUNITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES THEM

2

SO DISPARATE IN THEIR CLAIMS WHEN MR. MOODY GETS TO HAVE

3

THREE AND MR. JEFFS GETS TO HAVE THREE, WHEN IN MANY

4

RESPECTS IT IS CLOSE TO THAT CASE.

5

FOR THE RECORD, SO I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT, WE NEED TO

6

ARGUE THAT OR DEAL WITH IT SO WE CAN ADVANCE OUR ARGUMENT

7

NOW.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

IT JUST SEEMS TO ME,

COUNSEL, I FEEL THAT THEY ARE

DISPARATE ENOUGH, JUST BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE, TO
PERMIT IT.

11

I DON'T THINK WE NEED THAT.
THE MOTION OF PLEASANT GROVE CITY TO PROHIBIT

12

ANY MENTION OF INSURANCE IS GRANTED, AND THE PARTIES

13

SHOULD BE CAUTIONED NOT TO TALK ABOUT INSURANCE AS AN

14

ISSUE.

15

(FURTHER MOTIONS DEALT WITH)

16
17
18
19
20
21

I, CREED H. BARKER, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING
PAGE TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID
PROCEEDING, TAKEN DOWN IN SHORTHAND UPON SAID DATE, AND
REDUCED TO WRITING THIS 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 1993.

22
23
S^

CREEXH.^-^A^KER, CSR

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

EXHIBIT 3
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 19

INSTRUCTION NO.

\C\

Yon are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2)
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at
the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is
inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.
If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence.

EXHIBIT 4
JURY INSTRUCTION 31

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and
distance from it, the driver approaching on die right has die right-of-way, and it is the dnty
of the driver approaching on die left to yield the right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering die
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left
to take the right-of-way, that driver must enter die intersection clearly ahead of the driver
approaching from the right.

EXHIBIT 5
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

M. Dayle Jeffs, #1655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant,
Pro-Tech Restoration, dba
Stone Carpets
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 388
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY CARRIER

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba STONE
CARPETS, WILLIAM ROGER SMITH, and
THE CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE,
Defendants.

Civil No. 910400680
Judge Ray M. Harding

The above entitled matter came on for trial to a jury with the Honorable Ray M.
Harding presiding, commencing on the 15th day of July, 1993 and being continued from time
to time and completing the trial thereof on the 23rd of August, 1993. The matter was submitted
to the jury on August 23, 1993 on special verdict interrogatories, which were answered in
pertinent part as follows:

1.

At the time and place of the accident in question and under the

circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Defendant William Roger Smith negligent?
Yes
2.

X

No

At that time and place of the accident in question and under the

circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Defendant, City of Pleasant Grove negligent?
Yes
3.

No

X

Only if you marked the answer to Question 1 "Yes", answer this question.

Was the negligence of William Roger Smith a proximate cause of the accident?
Yes
5.

X

No

At the time and place of the accident in question and under the

circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier, negligent?
Yes
6.

X

No

Only if you marked the answer to question 5 "Yes", answer this question.

Was the negligence of the Shirley Carrier a proximate cause of the accident?
Yes
7.

X

No

Considering all the fault which caused the accident at 100%, what

percentage of that fault was attributable to:
A. The Defendant, William Roger Smith
(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 1 and 3)

40 %

B. The Defendant, City of Pleasant Grove
(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 2 and 4)

%

C. The Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier

60 %

(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 5 and 6)
The totals of A, B, and C must equal 100%.
The jury was polled and the above-mentioned answers were unanimous.
The court having directed that a verdict enter in accordance with the jury's answer
to the special verdict interrogatories, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered
in favor of the defendants Pro-Tech Restoration, dba Stone Carpets, William Roger Smith, and
The City of Pleasant Grove and against the plaintiff of no cause of action and the complaint of
the plaintiff is hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to the defendants in the amount of $
to Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration, dba Stone Carpets, $
William Roger Smith, and $
DATED and signed this

to City of Pleasant Grove.
day of August, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Ray M. Harding
District Court Judge
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